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2 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, PLANS AND OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: CIA/OPC Strategic Plan

The Eastern European Division has carefully examined the draft of the OPC Strategic Plan dated 15 June 1951, and presents its comments as follows:

1. Page 1: "period covered": We do not perceive the purpose served by the one year's distinction between the operational plan period and the mobilization build-up period. ✓ x

2. Bottom of page 1 and top of page 2: We seriously question the second assumption. The statement is made elsewhere in the plan that in the event of a so-called state of war, OPC activities should be placed under military control. If the second assumption is accepted, the responsibility of OPC should be to turn over its functions at the end of the period involved to the military authorities. We do not believe such a step would be wise. *this should not be*

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3. The fourth assumption on page 2 should be phrased in terms of areas rather than countries in order to include Berlin. We also believe that [] should be added to the list of areas listed in this fourth section.

4. [] should also be added to the list of areas listed in assumption number five.

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5. The last sentence at the foot of page 4: In our opinion this adds nothing substantial to the point made in the first sentence of this paragraph; we recommend the deletion of this sentence. *Conclude, connect*

6. Concept number two of page 7 seems to us a meaningless phrase. *should be deleted*

7. Concept number four is merely the expression of a very pious hope and should be deleted. *mix* [] *D day applies*

8. Concept number five on page 7 is merely a statement of what we are supposed to be doing and should be deleted. *agree*

9. Subheading B on page 8 seems to us to over-emphasize the mere build-up aspect of OPC operations during the next three years. If this concept of build-up only is accepted, a great many current operations should be deferred. *restate or cover under priorities*

10. The only two strategic principles that are listed under subheading C on pages 8 and 9 that we believe worth mentioning are numbers seven and nine. We believe the others listed could contribute nothing to our thinking or to our operations. *This is all manual material*

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11. The first operational assumption on the top of page 10, in that it emphasizes active operations during the coming three months, appears to conflict with subheading B on page 8. *- rix - this holds on 10th*

12. Operational assumption 3 on page 10 is so vaguely worded as to serve little or no purpose. We believe it should be deleted. *- rix - important*

13. On page 11 the statement of mission in paragraph 1-c is objectionable to us, because it seems to assume defeat in the cold war. *add, if necessary*

14. We do not believe it is the function of OPC "to defend the non-Communist world against further Communist encroachments", as expressed at the top of page 12. OPC is merely one covert arm of the Government and can only contribute to such a defense; it should not assume the responsibility for the defense itself. *change to assist in the* ILLEGIB

15. Nor do we believe it is the function of OPC to "initiate the subversion of Red China and Eastern Europe". OPC can only contribute towards the subversion of any area by covert means. The decision as to the initiation of subversion, details as to the actual instigation of the revolt, of a given area is a governmental decision. Moreover, we suggest, therefore, that this sentence be revised to read as follows: "to prepare for and contribute towards the subversion of the government of Red China and the governments of Eastern Europe." *check*

we are changing entire statement of approach
16. We believe that should be added to the list of countries in paragraph 1-a on pg. 12. 25X6

17. We believe that the language in paragraph 1-b on page 13 is too sweeping. The responsibilities of WE in here, as we understand it, limited to cultural and scientific activities. *- check ??*

we are removing the word
18. We suggest that Trieste should be added to the list of areas in paragraph two on page 13, and that the phrase at the end of this list, "and western approaches to the USSR", be deleted because it is meaningless.

19. Paragraph 2-a on page 15 should be deleted, as it is meaningless. *It is not - Poor not read.* X

20. Paragraph 2-f on page 16 seems to us to be the ultimate goal to which we are striving, and should not be included in a long list of other so-called missions. *- we should place in higher position*

21. On page 19 the Special Projects Division is given responsibility for executing covert operations which transcend area boundaries. We wish to point out that SP has no facilities for executing any project; this responsibility remains with the operating divisions and their field stations. *- this you know about - I don't - but kind to agree on first thought.* ILLEGIB

22. Paragraph 6-c appears to be

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22. Paragraph 6-c appears to be an attempt to describe defection as a special project. If this is in truth what is intended, we believe that defection should be stated as a special project without the circumlocution contained in the present paragraph. *given note*

23. Paragraph D at the top of page 20 seems to us meaningless and should be deleted.

24. With regard to the section on "imposed tasks" starting at the top of page 20, we believe insufficient thought has been given to the priority of these various tasks. Moreover, we do not understand what is meant by paragraph 1-b on page 20. With regard to paragraph 1-c, the question involved, cover, is a most intricate one which requires lengthy consideration at a very high level. *not given any relative priority*

25. We do not understand in what sense the task played on in paragraph 6 on page 21 is basically different from the job that is now being done.

26. In general, we believe this plan to be confusing in regard to the subject priority of these efforts, and, in fact, the character of the main OPC effort at the present time. It is indicated in the beginning of the paper that major emphasis should ^{now} be laid on building up an organization for future use. Later on in the paper, current operating responsibilities are allocated to individual OPC divisions. The lack of any clean-cut priority among the responsibilities is noticeable.

27. Annex A contains excerpts from documents setting forth U. S. policy with respect to countries in Eastern Europe. These papers were prepared by the Department of State to furnish general policy guidance. The dates these papers were prepared vary considerably. In our opinion, not only the papers themselves, but excerpts contained in Annex A are so general that they do not afford us full operational guidance, and do not, therefore, contribute anything substantial to the proposed OPC's Strategic Plan. The statements in these papers are, of course, routine knowledge to EE personnel. We recommend the deletion of Annex A from the proposed Plan.

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Stat. Plan. (memos)

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